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SCORPIONS IN A CORKED BOTTLE: THE DUBIOUS
REDISTRICTING JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
STEVEN B. LICHTMAN*
As the state of Maryland embarks on a politically contentious process
of drawing the boundaries of its legislative districts, it will be doing so
against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s meandering history on
gerrymandering. Perhaps more than the caselaw on any other subject, the
Court’s caselaw on redistricting is affected by political considerations—race
and party politics as the two most prominent variables—which demonstrate
how constitutional jurisprudence is shaped by institutional concerns. This
Article will track the development and evolution of the Supreme Court’s work
on redistricting, with special attention being paid to these political dynamics.
INTRODUCTION
If nothing else, David Lewis was at least candid.
I propose that we draw the maps to give a partisan advantage to 10
Republicans and three Democrats . . . because I do not believe it’s
possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and two Democrats.1
Lewis, representing the 53rd District in the North Carolina House of
Representatives, served as the co-chair of the Redistricting Committee from
2011 to 2018, and was one of the people in charge of the state’s 2020
redistricting process. Nobody expected North Carolina Republicans to draw
a balanced bipartisan map, and nobody could have been surprised that they
turned the task into a closely held and impenetrable process. Lewis and State
Senator Robert Rucho retained the services of Thomas Hofeller, the former
redistricting coordinator of the Republican National Committee, and
assigned him the job of drawing up several possible maps. Lewis and Rucho
instructed Hofeller that all of his map options should “minimize the number
© 2022 Steven B. Lichtman.
* Steven Lichtman is Associate Professor of Political Science and Pre-Law Advisor at
Shippensburg University and is also the Executive Director of the New England Political Science
Association. He received his Ph.D. from Brandeis University, and prior to that he received his J.D.
from New York University School of Law. He would like to thank Professor Mark Graber of the
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law for over twenty years of mentorship and
friendship.
1. Adam Liptak, Partisan Gerrymandering Returns to a Transformed Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/us/politics/gerrymanderingsupreme-court.html.
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of districts in which Democrats would have an opportunity to elect a
Democratic candidate.”2 Although the Committee went through the motions
of soliciting public comment on how redistricting should proceed, Hofeller
had completed his work before public commenting was opened. The fact that
his maps were then presented unchanged to the Committee meant that, in the
words of the federal court that assessed the situation, “the 2016 Plan did not
reflect any public input.”3 Unsurprisingly, the North Carolina legislature
approved the map on a party-line basis.
But it wasn’t just the rules and applications in North Carolina that were
significant. Lewis’ jarringly unapologetic remarks signaled a definitive tonal
shift, in which the architects of a gerrymander no longer felt the need to
apologize for their actions.
In the not-too-distant past, legislators engaged in gerrymandering would
usually attempt to deny the partisan nature of their districting choices.
Consider what had played out in Pennsylvania two decades earlier, in Vieth
v. Jubelirer.4 Following the 2000 census, Pennsylvania Republicans
engineered a pointedly hardball map for Congress in their favor, partially as
retribution for a similarly partisan map drawn by Democrats in the previous
cycle. In one notorious instance, the Pennsylvania GOP gerrymandered two
longtime Democratic incumbents, Jack Murtha and Frank Mascara, into the
same new district, crafting a “scorpions in a bottle” scenario guaranteed to
knock one of them out of Congress via a primary defeat.5
Even though the intentions undergirding their actions were obvious
when the Pennsylvania Republicans had to defend the map in the United
States Supreme Court, they tried to obscure their motivations. In their brief,
they rhetorically asked of their opponents, “[A]re Appellants the Santorum
Democrats or the Gore Democrats?”6
In referencing a Republican Senator and a Democratic presidential
nominee, and the possibility that a registered Democrat might vote for either
2. Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 803 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
3. Id. at 807.
4. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
5. The unlucky scorpion was Mascara, because the new district was drawn mostly along the
lines of Murtha’s old one, but with one new boundary shot outward, using redistricting software, to
collect Mascara. Not long after his primary loss to Murtha hastened his retirement from politics,
Mascara commented on the precision that the computers enabled. Once the new map was in place,
Mascara noted, were he to move his car into a new parking space across the street for weekly streetcleaning, he would be driving to a new congressional district. “When I came out my door, I was in
the 18th [District] and, when I crossed the street to my car, I was in the 20th . . . .” Chris Buckley,
Mascara Recalls Political Career, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV. (Aug. 20, 2007, 12:00 AM),
https://archive.triblive.com/news/mascara-recalls-political-career/.
6. See Brief of Appellees at 47, Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (No. 02-1580), 2003 WL 22439888, at
*47.
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(or both) of them, the Pennsylvania Republicans were arguing that they
weren’t really engaging in partisan gerrymandering because there was no real
way to predict how voters would actually vote. The fact that someone is
registered to a political party, they insisted, does not guarantee that they will
always vote for that party’s candidates.7 And as long as voters, even ones
with partisan loyalties, retained freedom of choice—and thus might cross
party lines in the voting booth—then what the Pennsylvania Republicans
were doing was merely inefficient political guesswork, and not a foolproof
scheme to rig an election that might rise to the level of a constitutional
problem.8
The fact that those sentiments were scarcely believable was beside the
point. The point was that those sentiments underscored the Pennsylvania
Republicans’ awareness, and perhaps even a fear, that were their actions to
be seen as “too partisan” they would be in practical legal jeopardy. Their
unwillingness to forthrightly admit that they were trying to foreordain the
results of an election was more likely canny tactics rather than residual
democratic shame, and the gambit paid off when the Court refused to strike
down the map.9 But it is still crucial to note that at that time, the Republicans
perceived a need to refrain from a full-throated embrace of their actions.
David Lewis and North Carolina’s Republicans, by contrast, perceived
no such need. It is possible that Lewis eschewed the obfuscatory language of
previous redistricters because he is a man of uncommon professional
honesty, but that is an unlikely explanation . . . one made even more unlikely
by his subsequent admission of criminal political corruption.10 It is instead
more likely that Lewis and his colleagues no longer felt any compunction
about exercising their patently partisan prerogatives, and no longer felt any
risk in frankly admitting what they were trying to do. Indeed, Lewis
confirmed their intentions with a rhetorical swagger that demonstrated the
national programmatic aims of the North Carolina GOP’s mapmaking: “I

7. Id. at 15–17.
8. Id.
9. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 291, 305–06.
10. In August 2020, Lewis had to resign his seat upon being indicted for making false
statements to a bank, misappropriating campaign funds, and failing to file federal income taxes. See
Will Doran, Powerful NC Lawmaker Took Donors’ Money for His Own Use, Prosecutors Say,
NEWS & OBSERVER, (Aug. 20, 2020, 8:44 PM) https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/article245118325.html. Lewis pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years of
supervised release. See Will Doran, No Prison Time for NC Politician who Took Almost $400,000
from Donors for Personal Use, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 17, 2021, 2:28 PM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article253547274.html.
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think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats . . . . So I drew
this map to help foster what I think is better for the country.”11
Their fearless instincts were soon vindicated. When their map was
challenged in Rucho v. Common Cause,12 the Supreme Court of the United
States not only allowed the map to be used, but also declared this challenge
and any other challenges to future partisan gerrymanders to be nonjusticiable
in federal court.13 Not only had the North Carolina Republicans won the case,
they had secured a blanket assurance for future similar attempts: They were
now free to double down on partisan gerrymandering, without any concerns
that a federal judge might invalidate their handiwork.
To anyone who had been paying attention to the short-term trends on
the Supreme Court in general, and to the long-term caselaw on redistricting
in particular, the ruling in Rucho could not have been a surprise, even though
it was a dramatic new legal principle. The Roberts Court’s intense distaste
for any regulations of the political process, combined with the disjointedly
uncertain jurisprudence on partisan gerrymandering, almost made the
draconian locking of the federal courthouse doors seem inevitable.
This Article will serve as a critical history of that jurisprudence. In
addition, mindful of an impending new case assessing judicial review of
redistricting in state courts,14 this Article will highlight where the Court might
take the issue next.
I. POLITICAL AND OTHER THICKETS
The initial wave of cases about the nature of legislative districts which
came before the Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century was triggered
by two phenomena that were not unrelated. The first is that most states had
neglected—or consciously refused—to properly redraw their maps for the
federal House of Representatives and for their state legislatures for several
decades, even though there had been vast population and demographic shifts
since the early 1900s. Importantly, the most prominent demographic shift had
11. See Liptak, supra note 1. In a self-penned defense of the map on the eve of oral argument
in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), Lewis and his North Carolina Senate
counterpart further explained that they felt that they might actually have had a chance to draw the
map with eleven Republican districts after all but charitably opted to demur. See Ralph Hise &
David Lewis, We Drew Congressional Maps for Partisan Advantage. That Was the Point.,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/ralph-hise-anddavid-lewis-nc-gerrymandering/585619/.
12. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
13. Rucho was decided alongside a companion case from Maryland, Lamone v. Benisek, 139
S. Ct. 783 (No. 18-726) (2019), which presented a gerrymander done by Democrats.
14. Harper v. Hall, 868 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022), cert. granted sub nom., Moore v. Harper, No.
21-1271 (U.S. June 30, 2022).
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been the exponential growth of cities. The state legislatures which refused to
reapportion were thus often engaged in a concerted effort to preserve the
disproportionate influence of rural areas, which would have lost political
power if legislative districts were apportioned accurately.15
That dynamic explains the second reason certain states had not
reapportioned. Given that a major sector of city growth was the migration of
racial minorities into urban areas, the below-the-radar explanation for state
legislatures’ inaction on reapportionment was that it was a subtle but virulent
means of disenfranchising African American voters.
As the first set of cases arrived at the Supreme Court, it soon became
clear that these two dynamics were important variables which determined the
depth and path of Court action. For multiple iterations of the Court, a
districting case with overt racial dimensions was a case they were prepared
to decide unambiguously.16 But if a districting case lacked overt racial
dimensions, the Court’s instinct was to pull back on the reins.
Thus, in the 1946 case Colegrove v. Green,17 a case which did not
present an explicit racial angle, a divided and short-handed Court ruled 4–3
that it lacked the “competence” to review Illinois’ congressional map, turning
aside a complaint by urban voters that the malapportioned map violated their
Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the laws.18 For Felix
Frankfurter, that lack of institutional competence was grounded in the
intimately and unavoidably political nature of drawing legislative
boundaries, and his wariness of getting the Court involved in what are
deemed political questions. “The one stark fact that emerges from a study of
the history of Congressional apportionment is its embroilment in politics, in
the sense of party contests and party interests[,]” Frankfurter wrote.19 He then
continued, “Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for
unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion
properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”20
15. For state legislative districts, these states would simply refuse to draw a new map at all,
enabling rural interests to remain dominant at the state level. For federal Congressional districts,
that option would not be generally feasible, since states would gain or lose seats in Congress based
on population changes. In such cases, a new map would be produced but would be badly
malapportioned in a way that under-represented urban areas.
16. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
17. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
18. Id. at 552; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Colegrove only had seven participating Justices
because Chief Justice Harlan Stone had died on April 22, 1946, (suffering a cerebral hemorrhage
while reading a dissent from the bench) and had not yet been replaced; and because Robert Jackson
had controversially taken an extended leave of absence from the Court to serve as the lead American
prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials in Germany.
19. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554.
20. Id. at 556.
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Frankfurter’s “political thicket” admonition became a famous slice of
Supreme Court prose, but it rested upon an utterly fatuous proposition: That
it was in fact possible for voters to “secure State legislatures that will
apportion properly” . . . when the whole point of malapportionment was to
make it hard, if not impossible, for voters in malapportioned districts to have
the voting power sufficient to effectuate the changes Frankfurter suggested
as the solution. Indeed, the problem in Illinois was not a product of
indifference or neglect, but rather purposively self-entrenching legislative
action: The map at issue in Colegrove had been drawn under the authority of
a 1901 state law that set down the rules and conditions for drawing district
boundaries.
While Colegrove did not present an overly race-motivated fact pattern,
the 1960 case Gomillion v. Lightfoot21 did. That case came from the city of
Tuskegee, Alabama, that, in 1957, had transformed its boundaries from what
had been a roughly square shape into “a strangely irregular twenty-eightsided figure.”22 But there was nothing strange about the irregularity. The
boundaries had been redrawn to keep Tuskegee’s white neighborhoods
within the city limits, while the city’s African American neighborhoods were
now in an unincorporated area that was under the city’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction. That meant that the African American neighborhoods were still
subject to the authority of the Tuskegee police force, but residents no longer
“lived in” Tuskegee (or anywhere else) as a matter of political participation,
and thus, they had been completely stripped of their ability to vote. As the
Court noted, the new boundaries disenfranchised all but a handful of
Tuskegee’s 400 African American voters, without disenfranchising a single
white voter.23 Discerning that the 1957 boundary re-draw was a blatantly
racist attempt to destroy African American voting in the city, the Supreme
Court unanimously invalidated the new map . . . in an opinion written by
Felix Frankfurter.
How did the same Justice who warned of the “political thicket” in
Colegrove now position himself as the avenging angel smiting a similar
attempt to restrict voter power? Gomillion presented an important factual
wrinkle not present in Colegrove. The plaintiffs in Colegrove had their votes
diluted, which they claimed was a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection of the laws. The plaintiffs in Gomillion, by contrast,
had their ability to vote completely destroyed, which they claimed was a
violation of their Fifteenth Amendment right to vote. Colegrove’s plaintiffs
may have had their vote devalued, but they still had the ability to vote. It was
21. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
22. Id. at 341.
23. Id.
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the total elimination of the vote that swung the case for Frankfurter. The
Colegrove complaint rested on a somewhat creative and attenuated
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but Tuskegee’s actions in
Gomillion were such an obvious and comprehensive violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on race-based denial of the vote that Supreme
Court action was both appropriate and seamless. For Frankfurter, this wasn’t
judicial intervention into politics, but rather judicial correction of racism.
This distinction is at the center of the rupture on the Court two years
later in Baker v. Carr.24 The baseline record in Baker was similar to what had
been observed—and waved away as nonjusticiable—in Colegrove: A state
had not redrawn its map for decades. Here, the state was Tennessee, which
had not changed its map since 1901, despite a nearly fourfold increase in the
state’s population. The malapportioned nature of the Tennessee General
Assembly was an astounding example of rapidly growing urban areas being
systematically underrepresented. Shelby County, which included the city of
Memphis, had seven seats in the legislature representing a population of
312,000; a ratio of one seat for every 45,000 people.25 By contrast, rural
Moore County had its own seat, despite having a population of just under
2,500.26 Had the Moore County ratio of 1 seat for 2,500 people been the
statewide standard, Shelby County would have been entitled to 125 seats,
instead of the 7 it had. The Assembly had 99 seats, and 63 of them
represented districts with a total of less than 40% of Tennessee’s voters.27
The Tennessee Senate was even worse: Of its 33 seats, 23 of them
represented districts with only 37% of the state’s voters.28
Although Baker presented the same kind of problem as Colegrove had
sixteen years earlier, it did not produce the same result. This time, a 6–2 Court
declared itself to be competent to hear reapportionment cases after all, and
Colegrove was overturned.29
In the years since Colegrove, the Court had been much transformed. In
1946, Frankfurter’s sprawling intellect and dominant personality made him
arguably the Court’s thought leader (especially with Robert Jackson away at
Nuremberg). He was, at the very least, a thought leader with enough
influence, and ability to corral votes, to offset the similar ambitions of Hugo
Black and William O. Douglas. But in 1962, Frankfurter’s advancing age,

24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. Id. at 262 tbl. 12 (Clark, J., concurring).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 253.
28. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 200 (2000).
29. Baker, 369 U.S. at 188 (majority opinion). Justice Charles Whittaker did not participate in
the decision. See id. at 237; infra note 38.
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combined with the arrival of Earl Warren in 1953 and William Brennan in
1957, left him in eclipse.
In Brennan, the Court had acquired a Justice who was both a cerebral
courtroom constitutionalist and a shrewd cloakroom politico. The genial
Brennan was an even more skilled vote-procurer than the irascible
Frankfurter. Indeed, it was precisely because of that skill that Black and
Douglas, noting the central necessity of persuading Potter Stewart to sign
onto the whole opinion (so as to avoid the plurality fracture of Colegrove),
successfully lobbied Warren to assign the opinion to Brennan, whom they
felt stood the best chance of bringing the reticent Stewart into the fold.30
In Warren, the Court was now led by a figure that the great American
legal historian G. Edward White has described as “an antidoctrinal force.”31
While Warren did not write for the Court in Baker, his approach to
constitutionalism had become the Court’s modus operandi, and is an ideal
means of understanding how and why the Court chose to abandon the
approach Frankfurter had urged in Colegrove. The Frankfurter vision of
judicial self-restraint and punctilious respect for institutional boundaries was
forsaken in favor of a “jurisprudence [that] emphasized the practical context
and moral implications of decisions and deemphasized doctrinal and
institutional constraints on judicial decision making,” and under Warren’s
leadership, most of his colleagues “came to realize, if only implicitly, that
doctrinal and institutional constraints on the Court are constructed rather than
cast in stone.”32

30. See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 186–90
(2010); see also ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 518 (1994).
31. G. Edward White, Earl Warren’s Influence on the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT
IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 44 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993); see also id. at 37–50.
32. Id. at 44. In fact, something similar to Warren’s equity-based approach had very nearly
carried the day in Colegrove. The fourth and deciding vote for nonjusticiablity in that 4–3 decision
came from Wiley Rutledge, who concurred only with the result. In his separate concurrence,
Rutledge emphasized that he felt that, contrary to Frankfurter’s general declaration of
nonjusticiability, the Court did indeed have the capacity to hear a case about the drawing of
legislative district lines, but that in this specific case the Court should “decline to exercise its
jurisdiction” because of the short interval before the next election. See Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549, 566 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Rutledge’s biographer characterizes this approach as “a theory of discretionary, equitable
power,” essentially arguing that Rutledge’s vote in Colegrove was a recognition of the potential for
unfairness were the Court to suddenly strike down the map without giving Illinois’ voters a chance
to remedy the problem before the election. JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE
OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 390 (2004). Rutledge felt that such a
step would force the 1946 election to be conducted as a statewide at-large process with no by-district
representation, which would have been manifestly unfair to Illinois voters entitled to that kind of
representation. See id. at 391.
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The “political question” doctrine that controlled in Colegrove is perhaps
the most salient example of a constructed constraint. There is no
constitutional rule barring the Court from hearing such matters, and both the
definition of what makes a case a “political question” and the breadth of the
Court’s reluctance to address such questions is a “rule” entirely of the Court’s
own making. What happened in Baker, then, was a simple matter of the Court
using a master key to unlock its own handcuffs.
There was a simple reason why the Court reached for that key.
Tennessee’s malapportionment was not just a case of a state with multiple
large cities being governed, as the mayor of one of those cities acidly noted,
“by the hog lot and the cow pasture.”33 It was clearly a situation in which a
prime reason for urban underrepresentation was a Southern state’s desire to
minimize the political power of African Americans. It was precisely because
of the nexus to institutional racism that Warren felt Baker was “the most
important case of my tenure on the Court.”34 For that sentiment to come from
the architect and author of Brown v. Board of Education35 is rather
remarkable, but it underscores Warren’s emphatic conviction that all of
America’s racial troubles—and especially the knot that Brown sought to
untie—were rooted in the original sin of denying basic political rights such
as citizenship and voting to African Americans.36
Brennan, Warren, and the other Justices in the 6–2 majority saw Baker’s
unmistakable racial context clearly. Felix Frankfurter, however, did not.
Whether he was simply blind to the racist overtones of Tennessee’s
malapportionment or blinded by rage in realizing that one of his most
cherished precedents was about to be discarded, Frankfurter dove into the
Court’s internal deliberations with a fury. In the first of a set of lengthy and
at times overwrought internal memoranda, Frankfurter insisted that Baker
was simply about politics, and not a case in which African Americans, as in
Rutledge’s approach—try to do the right thing, or at least try to avoid doing the wrong
thing—seems to foreshadow the ruling in Baker, and it is fair to wonder how Rutledge would have
approached Colegrove had the timetable not been so compressed. Indeed, Rutledge’s unsuccessful
attempt to get the Court to rehear the case the following year suggests that he saw his vote in
Colegrove as a limited position with no application beyond that case, and that he was likely
unnerved at how the main opinion in Colegrove had exploded into an across-the-board standard,
courtesy of Frankfurter’s sweeping language (and also likely courtesy of Frankfurter’s domineering
personality). Id. That said, the attempted rehearing was the only real countermeasure Rutledge
undertook; as Ferren notes, “Rutledge maintained a reluctance for the federal courts to interfere
with state election procedures.” Id. Yet it appears that Rutledge’s reluctance was more of a function
of equity than doctrine, similar to Warren’s methodology.
33. POWE, JR., supra note 28, at 200.
34. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. See JACK HARRISON POLLOCK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 209
(1979).
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Gomillion, had seen their right to vote zeroed out. Although characterizing
Baker as politics was certainly true, Frankfurter’s further insistence that
African American voting power had not been systematically devalued was
not.37 Alarmed at the prospect of Colegrove being overruled, Frankfurter
either could not or would not see the racial malevolence at work in
Tennessee, a force virtually identical to that which was at work in Tuskegee,
Alabama.38
As dramatic and sweeping as the Baker decision was, its dramatic nature
was confined to the disposal of Colegrove and the concomitant statement of
intent from the Court to be able to hear and decide apportionment disputes.
What Baker lacked was an announcement of a standard to be used when
deciding those disputes. This hole, however, was filled in short order. In a
pair of 1964 decisions, Wesberry v. Sanders39 and Reynolds v. Sims,40 the
Court announced the general standard now known as “one person one
vote,”41 and specifically declared that “the Equal Protection Clause requires
that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both
houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”42
It is central to note, as Edward White did, that just as “doctrinal and
institutional constraints on the Court are constructed,” so too are the rules
which the Court employs to free themselves—and, crucially, other courts—
from those constraints.43 As Lucas Powe noted, Earl Warren’s opinion in
Reynolds “directly answered the Harlan-Frankfurter claim that there were no
judicially manageable standards. There were; any judge can count and
determine if the population among districts is equal.”44

37. See NEWMAN, supra note 30, at 517–18.
38. Frankfurter’s mania to save his opinion in Colegrove ultimately turned tragic. Many of his
frantic memos were directed at Justice Charles Whittaker, who was already feeling ill at ease in his
job, and for whom Frankfurter’s persistent pressure proved to be physically destabilizing. In the
spring of 1962, Whittaker suffered a nervous breakdown and had to be hospitalized, and shortly had
to resign from the Court on orders from his doctor; this is the reason he ultimately took no part in
the consideration of the case. But Whittaker was not the only victim of Frankfurter’s campaign;
another victim turned out to be Frankfurter himself. One month after Whittaker’s health-induced
retirement, Frankfurter collapsed at his desk from a stroke. Solicitor General Archibald Cox—a
longtime friend who had argued as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs in Baker—visited
Frankfurter immediately following the stroke and came away convinced that his mentor blamed the
case for his condition. See KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 169–70
(1997).
39. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
40. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
41. Id. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)).
42. Id. at 577.
43. White, supra note 31, at 44.
44. POWE, JR., supra note 28, at 248. John Harlan II was the only other vote in dissent in Baker;
he also dissented in Wesberry and Reynolds.

2022]

SCORPIONS IN A CORKED BOTTLE

11

This standard was easy to apply in cases of malapportionment, when
districts’ populations were so wildly divergent that a denial of Equal
Protection was fairly clear. A much more complicated question is whether
the Equal Protection Clause—or any other constitutional guarantee—is
violated by districts that functionally adhere to the “one person one vote”
rule, but which are drawn to functionally marginalize the votes of a particular
political party. It is certainly possible to read Baker v. Carr as a sweeping
statement that American courts can, and perhaps even should, review the
process of drawing legislative districts if that process results in a denial of
basic democratic fairness. Earl Warren, and the five other Justices in the
majority, certainly saw the decision that way.
But it is also possible to view Baker as a precedent confined to racial
and mathematical inequality. Crucially, it is equally possible for another
iteration of the Supreme Court to make the choice to see it this way. Starting
in 1986, a Court dominated by conservatives would purposefully opt for that
more limited version.
II. THE SEARCH FOR A STANDARD . . . OR, THE SEARCH FOR THE LACK OF A
STANDARD
The reapportionment cases from 1946 to 1964 were not centered on
districting infested with partisan overtones. That was ascribable to the fact
that the southern states which were trying to disenfranchise African
Americans were dominated by the same Democratic Party responsible for the
New Deal and the Great Society, at least in name. The catch, however, was
that the Democratic Party of the south was much different from its northern
incarnation. The southern variant was dominated by the very same
conservatives who hold sway in the region in the twenty-first century, but
back then none of those conservatives would be caught dead aligning with
the political party founded by Abraham Lincoln and other 1850s
abolitionists. For the first century of its existence, the Republican Party had
no presence in the south.
But as the Democratic Party began to speak out strongly in favor of civil
rights in the mid-1960s, the partisan loyalty of southern conservatives was
now in play. Once they sensed that the Democrats had moved away from
them on the issue they deemed foundationally important, southerners
increasingly hitched their political fortunes to the other party, which
happened to be speaking more expansively to their conservative soul. The
result, which took decades to evolve, was that the Democrats and
Republicans eventually stood for diametrically opposing ideological
positions in a way that had never been true since the Civil War. Southern
conservatives left the Democratic Party en masse, leaving behind a party that
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was almost entirely center-left; those conservatives stormed into the
Republican Party, taking control of it and purging the liberal and centrist
Republicans that they derided as “RINOs” (Republicans In Name Only).
Once that dynamic began to set, partisan gerrymandering became more than
just the game of politics; it became a matter of political life-and-death.
As the two parties’ transformation was underway, it was inevitable that
the Supreme Court would be presented with cases about gerrymanders which
were exclusively partisan in nature. Ironically, in their first such foray, the
Court was asked to review a map that was designed specifically to avoid
giving a political party an unfair and disproportionate advantage.
In 1973, in Gaffney v. Cummings,45 the Court scrutinized a map that was
“aimed at a rough scheme of proportional representation of the two major
political parties.”46 The map for Connecticut’s state legislature had been
drawn with the express goal of distributing seats among the two major parties
in precise proportion to the popular vote share each party received.47 The
problem, as the plaintiffs argued, was that the districts had population
variances that did not live up to the one person one vote formula.
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the map, noting the good faith effort to
generate a map which was congruent with voters’ collective will.48
Gaffney seemed like a lab experiment in what political scientist Arend
Lijphart termed “consociational democracy.”49 The next case, Davis v.
Bandemer,50 was decidedly more confrontational.
Following the 1980 census, Indiana’s congressional districts seemed to
have been gerrymandered for Republican political advantage. Republicans,
who commanded a majority in the legislature when the time arrived to draw
the new map, occupied all of the seats on the redistricting committee.
Democrats were “advisors” to the committee, but had no vote on the plan,
nor did they have access to either the computerized data the committee used
or to the committee’s deliberations. The map that emerged from this onesided process paid specific and unusual attention to the two counties where
the state’s largest cities were located—Marion County (Indianapolis) and
Allen County (Fort Wayne). Rather than simply create contiguous districts
within those two counties which respected established political subdivisions,
the new map chopped up those counties’ strong Democratic precincts into

45. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
46. Id. at 738.
47. The map-drawers seem to have succeeded; as the Court noted, there was only a 1.9%
deviation. Id. at 737.
48. Id. at 754.
49. See Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 207, 207–25 (1969).
50. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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smaller shards and attached those shards to larger Republican precincts in
outlying areas, thereby rendering what had been seats Democrats could win
into outnumbered Democratic boroughs within Republican strongholds.
In the first election held using the new map, Democrats won 52% of the
statewide vote for the Indiana House of Representatives, but only secured 43
of the chamber’s 100 seats.51 The effect was especially evident in Marion
County and Allen County. In those two counties combined, Democrats won
a shade under 47% of the vote, but because the counties had been subdivided
into so many small pieces which had then been barnacled onto safe
Republican seats, Democrats won only 3 of the 21 seats that covered the two
counties.52 State Democrats filed suit, claiming that the map violated their
rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
Bandemer presented two questions. First, were exclusively partisan
gerrymanders justiciable? Second, if so, did the Indiana map rise to the level
of a constitutional violation?53 The bifurcated nature of the case,
unsurprisingly, produced a decision that was as imprecise as it was fractured,
and an opinion which was signed in its entirety by only four Justices: Byron
White, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun.
Writing for that group of Justices along with Lewis Powell and John
Paul Stevens, White first held that political gerrymanders were not
nonjusticiable, and that they could be subjected to judicial assessment.54 By
declaring courts to be competent, at least conceptually, to handle these cases,
White seemingly shoveled another mound of dirt onto Frankfurter’s cast-off
counsel that the political thicket should be avoided at all costs.
The Indiana Democrats had scored an important victory by persuading
six Justices to leave the courthouse door open, but having won that battle,
they immediately lost the war, as White then announced that the map was
constitutionally acceptable. Only Stevens and Powell dissented from that
holding and argued in favor of upholding the lower court’s invalidation of
the map. The remaining Justices in White’s coalition (along with Warren
Burger, William Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O’Connor, who would have
declared the matter nonjusticiable), agreed with White that the plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment rights had not been violated.
White acknowledged that the Indiana Republicans had set out to
disadvantage the Indiana Democrats, and further acknowledged that they had
succeeded: The facts in the record, White conceded, “support a finding that
an intention to discriminate was present and that districts were drawn in
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 115 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 118–27 (majority opinion).
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accordance with that intention . . . .”55 But that was not enough to constitute
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, which was so overt that it required
judicial intervention. Holding that the lower courts had applied an
incongruous and incorrect standard, White declared that “unconstitutional
discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner
that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the
political process as a whole.”56 Merely making it “more difficult for a
particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its
choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm.”57 At its heart,
White’s decree meant that only an attempt to relegate a party to permanent
minority status—rather than an attempt to secure a partisan advantage in a
given individual election—would be a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
As a result, the merits portion of White’s opinion read like Frankfurter
Lite. Although it did not officially declare gerrymandering to be completely
off-limits, as Frankfurter certainly would have done, it did set the bar for
judicial reversal of a map so high that it might have been functionally
impossible for the complainant in a partisan gerrymandering case to actually
prevail. White’s rule required a pattern of results over several different
elections, and even if the requisite amount of evidentiary support could be
marshalled, there was still the problem of the criteria to be used to evaluate
it. Not only was White maddeningly unclear on this front, but he also
questioned the utility of the list of factors that Powell, writing separately,
would have set as the governing standard.58
Given the murky nature of White’s opinion, it might be that the best
way to understand it is that the Court did not want to take a step—slamming
the courthouse door shut, and reviving Frankfurter’s discredited “political
thicket” portent—which might have been politically provocative. To declare
partisan gerrymanders nonjusticiable on their face would have been to
announce that the political parties were perfectly free to try to rig elections
in their favor. This statement in turn would have been seen as a major
departure from the malapportionment rulings of the 1960s, which embraced
Supreme Court intervention in the drawing of legislative districts. By 1986,
those rulings were regarded as a key component in a lionized Supreme Court
campaign against institutional racism, and the Court was undoubtedly loath
to chip off pieces of its own legacy. By leaving the door to the courthouse
open, but also by providing no reliable guidance about how to walk through
it, the Court was able to dodge withering political blowback while paying lip
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 138–42 (citing id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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service to the idea of judicial correction of egregious abuses of the political
process.
For the next thirty-three years, the Court unsteadily tiptoed along the
tightrope it had laid out for itself: Unwilling to estop the judiciary from
reviewing partisan gerrymanders, but unable (or so it claimed) to craft a
workable standard that would make such cases decidable.
The purported lack of a workable standard made the Court’s
gerrymandering jurisprudence acutely frustrating, as they confronted fact
patterns which were increasingly outrageous. The “scorpions in a bottle”
gambit in Vieth v. Jubelirer, which was facilitated by a computer program so
sophisticated that it was able to gerrymander one incumbent’s house into the
other incumbent’s district, is one example.59 Yet even this tactic was
surpassed by the brazen actions of Texas Republicans in League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry,60 where the state GOP sought to impose a
new Congressional map in the middle of a decade, to replace a map that had
been implemented at the customary time, solely because the original map did
not generate enough Republican victors.61 But as they had done in Vieth, the
Court soberly announced that without a coherent applicable rule, there was
no way to determine whether an aggressively partisan gerrymander violated
a constitutional norm62—even a second effort, in the middle of a decade,
outside the norm of drawing a map only after a new census, was apparently
not enough to justify judicial intervention. Texas’s mid-decade redistricting,
like Pennsylvania’s scorpions-in-the-bottle map, was allowed to stand.63
Over time, it became harder and harder to take seriously the Court’s
self-professed inability to discern a standard; it instead appeared as though
the Court was bending over backwards to avoid certifying a rule, even though
sensible options were available. In his Bandemer dissent, Lewis Powell had
proposed a simple test which would be no harder to operationalize than other
59. See supra note 5.
60. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
61. The driving force behind this effort was the outspoken Texas Republican Congressman
Tom DeLay, whose brusquely insistent manner, and habit of applying remorselessly implacable
pressure to get what he wanted in politics, were the basis of his nickname, “The Hammer.” League
of United Latin American Citizens (“LULAC”) was one more brick in DeLay’s wall; as one of his
lieutenants bluntly admitted about the mid-decade redistricting, “our goal is to elect more
Republicans.” See STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN
TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY 132 (2007); see also Justin Levitt, LULAC v. Perry:
The Frumious Gerry-Mander, Rampant, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 238 (Joshua A. Douglas &
Eugene D. Mazo, eds., 2016).
62. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420.
63. The Court in LULAC hung its conclusion on the fact that the first map had been drawn by
a panel of three federal judges after the Texas legislature had been unable to reach agreement; the
mid-decade map was allowed to stand seemingly because it was the legislature’s first bite at the
apple, as it were. Levitt, supra note 61, at 238.
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rubrics the Court has employed in other situations: Simply ask if those
responsible for drawing the district were “motivated solely by partisan
considerations.”64 Eighteen years later, dissenting in Vieth, John Paul Stevens
wondered aloud why this test had been so casually rejected.65
Perhaps out of recognition that this particular horse had been forcibly
thrown out of the barn, David Souter, in his own Vieth dissent, proposed a
new test centered on a set of relatively straightforward questions: (1) Is the
plaintiff in an identifiable political group?; (2) Were traditional districting
principles such as compactness and contiguousness ignored?; (3) Can the
deviation from those principles be linked to partisan reasons?; (4) Can a new
district be crafted in accordance with those principles?; and (5) Can the
plaintiffs show that the deviation from traditional districting principles was
intentional, rather than merely coincidental?66 Here as well, a Court majority
simply elected not to take up this remedy.
The Court’s stubborn insistence that no rule existed for evaluating
partisan motivations in redistricting stood in stark and dubious contrast to
their unrelenting hostility towards racial motivations in redistricting—and
their stampeding eagerness to impose an absolute and uncompromising rule
governing them. In Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I),67 the Court invalidated a North
Carolina redistricting plan with a stated goal of creating two majorityminority Congressional districts.68 Starting with Davis v. Bandemer in 1986,
the Court had tolerated partisan motivations in districting; Shaw both
perpetuated that toleration and stood as a dogmatic zero-tolerance policy for
racial motivations in districting.69
In her opinion for the Court, Sandra Day O’Connor reached for the wellestablished strict scrutiny test and declared that race-based gerrymanders
would have to be necessarily related to a compelling government interest in

64. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 177 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
65. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 339, 339 n.33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 347–50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
68. Id. at 657–58. This presaged O’Connor’s majority opinion two years later, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995), declaring that the strict scrutiny test applied
to any governmental classifications grounded in racial considerations.
69. The Shaw litigation was so convoluted that it returned to the Court three additional times,
each time with a different name—Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899 (1996), Hunt v. Cromartie,
526 U.S. 541 (1999), and Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)—and took so long to resolve
that a new census was held before the proceedings were finished. In the final iteration of the case,
the Court concluded that the challenged district (which had been amended multiple times since the
original complaint) was constitutionally acceptable, because it had been drawn not to guarantee a
victory by a racial minority, but rather to guarantee a victory by the incumbent Congressman,
Melvin Watt, who happened to be African American. Easley, 532 U.S. at 257.
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order to be allowed to stand.70 However, she also curtly rejected the notion
that this demanding methodology would be appropriate for political
gerrymanders, and limited its application to racial ones.71 By doing so,
O’Connor fell back on a path of extreme caution, opting to hold the Court
out of what she anticipated to be discomforting political controversies.
O’Connor’s wary and pragmatic caution, however, stood in stark
contrast to the reckless language she deployed to illustrate her antipathy for
race-based redistricting, most notably the final word she used:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may
have little in common with one another but the color of their skin,
bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.72
This sentence, written by Sandra Day O’Connor, is the ugliest passage
in the history of the Supreme Court.
It is not easy to write something even more repugnant than Roger
Taney’s racially noxious idea that “the [N]egro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit,”73 or Oliver Wendell Holmes’s insensitive
defense of the forced sterilization of a woman on the grounds that “[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough.”74 Yet somehow Sandra Day O’Connor
managed to exceed those horrors by callously insinuating that an effort to
increase the political voice of African Americans was the moral equivalent
of South Africa’s murderous regime of white supremacy.
Theoretically, we might leaven the disgust by hypothesizing that those
words were written by an overheated clerk, and that O’Connor simply let the
sentence slide without giving it the careful critical review that ideally would
have snuffed it out before it went to print. But even if O’Connor merely
committed the sin of poor supervision of her clerks, it is still her name on that
opinion, and thus her ownership of a contemptible, obtuse, and utterly vile
comparison.
70. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 649.
71. Id. at 650. Of course, by 1993 there was an alternative to strict scrutiny: The so-called
“intermediate” or “heightened” scrutiny test, in which governmental action need only “serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives,” as opposed to the strict scrutiny rule that governmental action must be necessary to
serve a compelling interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). This intermediate
language had already been applied to gender discrimination in Craig, and it had also been applied
to symbolic speech. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). Presumably, it
could also have been applied to partisan gerrymandering, where the Court inclined to seriously
address it.
72. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647.
73. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
74. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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The Court in the Burger and Rehnquist eras can fairly be described as
coexisting uncomfortably with political gerrymandering. Although the Court
in those years never struck down a challenged district as so excessively
partisan that it violated constitutional dictates, it also pointedly refused to
foreclose on the possibility that a workable standard might magically emerge
(even as it sometimes seemed as though the Court was searching for such a
standard with its hands covering both of its eyes). The arrival of John Roberts
would signal the end of the discomfort, in favor of a comfortable and at times
cynical embrace of political gerrymandering.
III. ROBERTS’S RULE OF PARTISAN DISORDER
It is more than a little ironic that a strong signal of Roberts’s disdain for
judicial intervention in the political process came in the isolated case in
which Roberts found himself in the minority: Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.75 The Court reviewed the
meaning of the Elections Clause of Article 1, Section 4 of the United States
Constitution—“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof”—and its application to a 2000 amendment to the
Arizona Constitution.76 That year, the state’s voters attempted to eliminate
partisan gerrymandering by taking the power to draw legislative districts
away from self-interested partisan elected officials, and placing it in the
hands of a nonpartisan body. This was done via a statewide ballot initiative
to amend the state constitution: Proposition 106, which created the Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission (“AIRC”).77 Following the passage
of this initiative, the AIRC crafted the maps for both the state legislature and
the federal Congress.
However, following the drawing of the 2010 map, Arizona Republicans
filed a lawsuit challenging the AIRC’s very existence. Ostensibly angered by
a map that did not give them enough of an advantage, the Arizona
Republicans argued that creation of the AIRC violated the Elections Clause.
They claimed that the “by the Legislature thereof” language in the Elections
Clause means that only a legislature could draw the map.78 Since the AIRC
was an independent body outside of the legislature, it did not have legitimate
constitutional authority.

75.
76.
77.
78.

576 U.S. 787 (2015).
Id. at 792 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
Id. at 796.
Id. at 792–93 (emphasis added).

2022]

SCORPIONS IN A CORKED BOTTLE

19

Although the text of the Elections Clause can plausibly be interpreted
along these lines, the problem was the breathtaking scope of the Arizona
Republicans’ argument, which boiled down to an assertion that they had a
constitutional right to gerrymander. It was one thing to suggest that the
Constitution does not provide courts with the means of reviewing political
districting; the Court had a dalliance with that argument in Colegrove and
had not entirely put it to one side. But it is another matter entirely to suggest
that the Constitution provides political parties an untrammeled right to zero
out true political competition and foreordain the results of an election. Even
for a Court which had never been willing to articulate and apply a standard
for reviewing gerrymanders, this audacious suggestion was a bridge too far,
and it was rejected by a 5–4 vote.
In order to do so, Ruth Bader Ginsburg had to get a little creative in her
interpretation of Article I, Section 4. Her solution was to perform a deep dive
into the meaning of the word “legislature,” and conclude that when the
Framers placed it in the Elections Clause, the word was simply a shorthand
for a body charged with the power of enacting legislation.79 From there,
Ginsburg noted that a different means of enacting legislation—the ballot
proposition—was unknown to the Framers, and so they could not possibly
have included it in so many words in the Constitution. But once that device
was invented in the early twentieth century by western progressives, it was
functionally similar to the legislative chambers of the Framers’ time—both
legislative chambers (via drafting and voting on statutes) and voters (via
drafting and voting on initiatives), Ginsburg reasoned, make laws.
Consequently, Ginsburg held that the word “legislature” should be construed
broadly, and construed to apply to the ballot initiative version of direct
democracy.80
The failure of the Arizona Republicans’ ploy may have been a matter of
gerrymandering advocates overplaying their hand. They were, after all,
claiming an inalienable right to entrench themselves by limiting the efficacy
of voter power. But their failure was also in tune with public distaste for
gerrymandering; there is a reason that Arizona voters wanted to eliminate it.
But as the 2010s wore on, the Supreme Court was not only unmindful of
voter revulsion at gerrymandering, it eventually issued a decision which flew
in the face of it. Ironically, the Court’s preoccupation with the danger that
could be done to its reputation were it to become entangled with the political
process may have induced an over-correction that proved just as
reputationally corrosive.

79. Id. at 804–08.
80. Id. at 822–23.
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At first, however, it appeared as though the Court might finally take an
aggressive step against political gerrymandering, because it likewise
appeared that the holy grail of a manageable standard was finally within
reach. In a case that resembled the machinations in Davis v. Bandemer,
Wisconsin Republicans enjoyed a statehouse majority after the 2010 census
which enabled them to control the redistricting. Like their Indiana
counterparts thirty years earlier, the Wisconsin Republicans completely
excluded Democrats from the map-drawing process, which was executed
behind closed doors. The map they came up with was a stunning exercise in
cabining and even defying the will of voters. In the 2012 election, the first
one held using the new map, Democratic candidates for the Wisconsin House
of Representatives won a 51.4% majority of the vote statewide—and yet
Republicans took a supermajority of 60 of the 99 seats in the chamber.81 In
2014, the variance continued; Democrats and Republicans split the statewide
popular vote evenly, but the Republicans won 65 of the 99 assembly seats.82
When this data was presented to the Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford,83
it was accompanied by the presentation of a standard that had been crafted
by election scholars: the “efficiency gap.”84 Proponents of this rule recognize
that there is no real way to ensure perfect proportionality between vote share
and seats won in a democracy which uses first-past-the-post single-member
districts; some variance is inevitable.85 But the idea behind the efficiency gap
is that if that variance is way out of proportion, it could be prima facie
evidence of a scheme to intentionally “waste” votes. That, it was alleged, is
what the Wisconsin Republicans did: By packing traditionally Democratic
precincts into a small handful of districts, they ensured that while Democrats
would win those districts 80% to 20%, Republicans would be able to win a
much larger number of districts by closer margins. In other words, the map
was designed to distribute Democrat votes in an intentionally inefficient
manner.86 Since any votes beyond a majority threshold just over 50% were
not needed to win the election, purposefully jacking up the margin from 50%
to 80% meant that the votes over that 50% line—which could have swung a
race in a neighboring district—were rendered functionally meaningless.
The efficiency gap looked like the manageable standard which had
previously proved elusive. It would have been a simple task to declare that a
81. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018).
82. Id.
83. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
84. Id. at 1924.
85. This is in contrast to a system of proportional representation, in which seats are allocated
after an election, using the vote results as the formula to determine how many seats a given political
party will receive in the legislature.
86. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1924.
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map producing a number of seats won that was mathematically unbalanced
with vote totals, would be considered suspect on its face. As a safeguard
against fluke election results, that inquiry could perhaps be made in
consecutive elections. However it would be operationalized, the “efficiency
gap” appeared to fit the requirement that the Court, ever since Davis v.
Bandemer, had claimed it was making a good faith effort to satisfy: The need
for an objective and easily-applied standard. When oral argument in Gill was
held in October 2017—scheduled to seemingly produce a decision well in
time for it to be applicable for the 2018 elections—there appeared to be
reason for optimism among critics of gerrymandering.
But then, months went by with no decision. The entire 2017–2018
Supreme Court term reached its final days . . . and still no decision. A
decision delay that lasts for an entire term, with a case argued in the term’s
first sitting in October and still not yet decided in June, is highly unusual, and
it suggested that the Court was beset by internal divisions. Sure enough, on
June 18, 2018, the case was unanimously punted back down to the lower
courts on the procedural question of whether the plaintiffs had incurred an
injury that would give rise to Article III standing, with no ruling either on the
merits of the dispute or the feasibility of the efficiency gap as a potential
standard.87
The petering out of the Wisconsin case could have been only a minor
blip; another case, with a less complicated record on standing, might
theoretically have put the efficiency gap right back in front of the Court as
an open invitation to embrace the standard’s utility. However, nine days after
the ruling-which-was-not-a-ruling in Gill came down, it was followed by a
profound judicial earthquake: Anthony Kennedy’s announcement that he was
retiring from the Court.88
On the issue of gerrymandering, there was no news bulletin which could
have been any more momentous. Kennedy had been the crucial fifth vote in
87. Id. at 1934. By remanding to the lower courts, the Supreme Court left the map in place for
2018, and the pattern of disproportionate representation continued unabated. In fact, it arguably
worsened: In the 2018 races for the Wisconsin Assembly, the Republicans won 63 of the 99 seats
despite winning less than 45% of the statewide popular vote. See WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N,
CANVASS
RESULTS
FOR
2018
GENERAL
ELECTION
(2018),
https://elections.wi.gov/elections/election-results/results-all#accordion-859
[https://web.archive.org/web/20181220230727/https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Canvass
%20Results%20(2).pdf]; see also 2018 Wisconsin State Assembly Election, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Wisconsin_State_Assembly_election (last visited Sept. 8,
2022).
88. Jacob Pramuk & Marty Steinberg, Anthony Kennedy Retiring from Supreme Court, CNBC
(June 28, 2018, 10:09 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/27/anthony-kennedy-retiring-fromsupreme-court.html; Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retiresupreme-court.html.
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Vieth to keep the courthouse door propped open for partisan gerrymandering
cases. Moreover, the effort to develop a workable rule seemed targeted at
him specifically, based on his statement in Vieth of how central such a “clear,
manageable, and politically neutral” standard would be to future dispositions
of the issue.89 Were Kennedy to be replaced by a new Justice who was more
skeptical of the justiciability of political gerrymanders, it could be gamechanging.
Yet, during oral argument the following year in Rucho v. Common
Cause, it sounded like that had not happened. Kennedy’s replacement, Brett
Kavanaugh, was described by The New York Times Supreme Court
correspondent Adam Liptak as “an exceptionally active participant in
Tuesday’s arguments, asking probing questions of both sides.”90 But at one
point Kavanaugh prefaced a question to the plaintiffs’ counsel with what
sounded like a telegraphed concession: “I took some of your argument in the
briefs and the amicus briefs to be that extreme partisan gerrymandering is a
real problem for our democracy—and I’m not going to dispute that . . . .”91
Political scientists and legal scholars have determined that the questions
a Justice asks during oral argument are usually a good predictor of how that
Justice will eventually vote. Researchers have found that a Justice who
signals support for an attorney’s position during oral argument invariably
votes in favor of that side of the case; similarly, if a Justice directs tough
questions towards only one side’s attorneys, that is a reliable indicator that
the Justice is going to vote against that side of the case.92
The remarkable statement Kavanaugh made, in which he agreed with
the proposition that partisan gerrymandering was deeply problematic, thus
seemed to portend good news for the petitioners. But it did not necessarily
guarantee that Kavanaugh was prepared to embrace the efficiency gap
standard and throw open the courthouse door to partisan gerrymandering
89. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307–08 (2004); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E.
Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint, 132 HARV. L. REV. 236, 236 (2018).
90. Adam Liptak, Justices Display Divisions in New Cases on Voting Maps Warped by Politics,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/us/politics/gerrymanderingsupreme-court.html.
91. Transcript of Oral Argument at 68, Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (No.
18-422)
[hereinafter
Rucho
Transcript
of
Oral
Argument],
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/18-422_5hd5.pdf.
92. See Ryan C. Black et al., Emotions, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision Making,
73 J. POL. 572, 573–74 (2011). Note, however, that other researchers have determined that the most
significant variable in predicting how a Justice will vote based on oral argument behavior is the
number of questions directed at a given attorney (along with the number of words in those
questions). The more questions a Justice asks of an attorney, the less likely that Justice will vote for
that attorney’s position. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Inferring the
Winning Party in the Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument, 39 J.
LEGAL STUD. 433, 433 (2010).
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lawsuits. Indeed, Kavanaugh also wondered aloud if the best approach might
be for the Court to remain on the sidelines while the issue was thrashed out
in the political arena, a suggestion which was also made by Stephen Breyer93
and Neil Gorsuch.94 But Kavanaugh’s statement certainly made it sound like
he was not at all prepared to resurrect the bogeyman of the political thicket
and bolt the courthouse door shut.
And yet, that’s exactly what he voted to do. When Rucho was ultimately
decided, Kavanaugh was the fifth and decisive vote for nonjusticiability, the
vote Anthony Kennedy had always resisted casting. Fifty-seven years after
Colegrove v. Green had been killed off, the Court reanimated it. Fifty-four
years after he died, Felix Frankfurter got the win.
Roberts’ opinion for a 5–4 Court arrayed along ideological lines was
premised on two observations. Each observation, however, rested on an
unstable foundation.
The first observation was an accounting of history. The term
“gerrymander,” Roberts noted, comes from a member of the founding
generation: Massachusetts’ Elbridge Gerry, who was evidently the first
person to hit on the idea that legislative boundaries could be drawn for
partisan advantage.95 To Roberts, this signified that the Founders knew that
districts could be engineered for political gain—and thus could have acted
against it—but chose instead to tolerate it. “To hold that legislators cannot
take partisan interests into account when drawing district lines,” Roberts
wrote, “would essentially countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust
districting to political entities.”96
In so writing, however, Roberts blithely (and probably intentionally) left
something out: The incontrovertible fact that those political entities trusted
by the Framers existed in a system that lacked strong political parties. The
Framers were pointedly hostile to political parties,97 an attitude most
famously manifested in James Madison’s classic warning about the dangers
93. Rucho Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 91, at 51–52.
94. Id. at 47.
95. Id. at 791 n.1 (citing ELMER CUMMINGS GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
GERRYMANDER 16–19 (Arno Press 1974)); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494
(2019). Gerry was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, but ultimately was one of only three
attendees in Philadelphia who refused to sign the final document. George Mason and Edmund
Randolph, both of Virginia, were the other two. Delegates of the Continental and Confederation
Congresses Who Signed the United States Constitution, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFF.
OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.house.gov/People/Continental-Congress/Signatories/ (last
visited Oct. 17, 2022).
96. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497.
97. This was a point emphasized by Elena Kagan in her caustic dissent. See id. at 2512
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing GORDON WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC 1789-1815, at 140 (2009)).
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of “faction” in The Federalist No. 10.98 That philosophical antipathy was
backstopped by numerous affirmative steps that the Framers took in an effort
to prevent parties from emerging in the new American system. They
intentionally refused to mention political parties in the Constitution, and they
structured the Constitution as a device which would control their excesses in
the unlikely event that they did emerge.99 The brutal partisanship of twentyfirst century actors such as David Lewis and the Arizona Republicans was
simply not possible in an eighteenth-century America where political parties’
reach was severely limited, both in fact and in theory. Roberts’s highly
selective reading of history was a careless, perhaps even deceitful,
transformation of the Framers’ definitive wish to control political parties into
a modern-day justification for empowering political parties.
Roberts’ second observation stressed the danger of the Court keeping
the courthouse door open. Even though partisan gerrymandering is
“incompatible with democratic principles,”100 Roberts nevertheless
cautioned that absent a once-and-for-all declaration of nonjusticiability, the
Court would find itself unavoidably dragged into the bog of every close
districted election. A losing candidate or party would always try to claim that
the map had been unconstitutionally rigged against them and would always
go to court to get the election invalidated. “[Judicial] intervention would be
unlimited in scope and duration,” Roberts warned.101 “[I]t would recur over
and over again around the country with each new round of districting, for
state as well as federal representatives.”102 Making an argument that
resembled Alexander Bickel’s 1962 embrace of “the passive virtues,”103
Roberts insisted that the Court must refrain from what he termed “an
unprecedented expansion of judicial power.”104
That pious claim to institutional modesty, however, was belied by
Roberts’ own history, which reveals that his sentiment was suffused with a
staggering degree of rank hypocrisy.
Roberts did not seem to see “an unprecedented expansion of judicial
power” when he personally gutted the Voting Rights Act, which had been

98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
99. For more on this idea of a “Constitution against parties,” see generally SIDNEY M. MILKIS,
THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES (1993).
100. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (majority opinion) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 791 (2015)).
101. Id. at 2507.
102. Id.
103. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
104. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
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renewed by Congress five times since its 1965 enactment.105 Nor would
Roberts have seen “an unprecedented expansion of judicial power” had the
Court nullified the directly-communicated will of Arizona’s voters and
voided the state’s redistricting commission, which as we have already seen
is precisely what Roberts wanted to do.106 Nor did Roberts see “an
unprecedented expansion of judicial power” when the Court, in an opinion
he joined, struck down campaign finance regulations which had been enacted
and amended by Congress, and which were based on an established principle
of limiting corporate influence on elections that dated back for over a
century.107
Indeed, Roberts’ disingenuous description of what the majority was
(and was not) doing in Rucho is best understood in tandem with his Court’s
dedicated all-out war on any form of restrictions on money in politics.
In its landmark 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo,108 the Court held that
a regulation which “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression” is
constitutionally impermissible.109 The danger of campaign finance rules, the
Court argued, is their potential to reduce the amount of the political speech
which serves as democracy’s lifeblood. As Alexander Meiklejohn argued in
his classic exploration of free speech: “What is essential is not that everyone
shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”110 The corollary,
then, to the Buckley principle is not only that a law which does not reduce the
amount of political speech can avoid constitutional infirmity, but also that a
law that increases the amount of political speech is a welcome development.
That should have been good news for the so-called “millionaire’s
amendment” to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”),111
which addressed the unbalanced playing field created when a wealthy selffunded candidate shovels boatloads of their own money into their campaign.
In such situations, BCRA delineates a new set of rules for the underfunded
opponent of the wealthy candidate. The opponent would have their
contribution limits increased (via a sliding scale of thresholds), thereby
enabling them to raise more money . . . which in turn (as the Court had stated
in Buckley) would allow them to pay for and thus generate more campaign
speech. By increasing the amount of available speech, the “millionaire’s
amendment” was a resounding reaffirmation of Buckley’s core holding.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
(1948).
111.

Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 385 (2010).
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 19.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq.).
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However, the Roberts Court found constitutional fault with it anyway.
In Davis v. Federal Election Commission,112 the millionaire’s amendment
was struck down not because it lowered the quantity of political speech—
since, as we have seen, it did the exact opposite—but instead because it
lowered the buying power of the wealthy candidate whose actions would
trigger its application. As Samuel Alito saw it, the problem with this
provision was that “the vigorous exercise of the right to use personal funds
to finance campaign speech produces fundraising advantages for opponents
in the competitive context of electoral politics.”113 Given Davis’ wholesale
inconsistency with the Court’s long-settled Meiklejohnian-goal of ensuring
that a maximum quantity of political speech be available to voters, the case
looked less like a principled statement on the meaning of the First
Amendment, and more like a purposive attempt to maximize the political
advantages enjoyed by wealthy interests . . . who, it must be pointed out, tend
to be found more on one particular side of the political aisle.
When Rucho is examined in this broader context, it leads to an
uncomfortable hypothesis. It cannot be gainsaid that the Republican Party
has been the primary beneficiary of the Roberts Court’s general crusade
against regulations in the political process, and thus the cases on partisan
gerrymandering are of a piece with the cases on campaign finance. As the
party more aligned with the corporate sector, the Republicans have been
eager to see the restraints removed from their corporate patrons’ ability to
press their massive financial advantages. It was not an accident that the
plaintiff in one key campaign finance case was the Republican Senate
Majority Leader;114 nor was it an accident that the plaintiff in the case that
took down the major regulatory precedents was an interest group founded in
1988 to advance conservative causes and boost the campaigns of Republican
candidates (and which was also known for its capacious and unyielding
hostility towards Hillary Clinton).115
The cases on partisan gerrymandering fit into this pattern. Although
Democrats are certainly not immune from the practice—the companion case
to Rucho was a Democratic Party gerrymander in Maryland116—for decades
it has been overwhelmingly Republicans who have engaged in
gerrymandering, who have gained advantages from engaging in
gerrymandering, and who have aggressively asserted the prerogative to

112. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
113. Id. at 739 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986)
(plurality opinion)).
114. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 111 (2003).
115. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
116. Lamone v. Benisek, 139 S. Ct. 783 (2019).
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engage in gerrymandering. Rucho should thus be seen as the capstone of a
systematic and coordinated effort by Republican candidates, officeholders,
and affiliated interest groups to defend and expand the party’s ability to rig
elections in its favor . . . an effort aimed at a Supreme Court that was both
majority conservative and had a majority of Justices appointed by Republican
presidents.117 The Supreme Court of course makes a habit of denying that its
decisions are premised on the political leanings of its members—and the
Roberts Court seems to have an inflated tendency to do this. But a case like
Rucho, in which the Court not only lends institutional support to the political
party responsible for the Court’s majority when it demands constitutional
support for its efforts at self-entrenchment, but also slams the door in the face
of anyone who would suggest that such entrenchment is toxic for democracy,
makes it hard to give the Court the benefit of the doubt.
Roberts’ door-slam was especially infuriating to the four dissenters, led
by Elena Kagan, who emphatically pointed out that state courts had recently
made considerable headway in devising the exact kind of “clear, manageable,
and politically neutral”118 rule that Anthony Kennedy had insisted upon.119 If
such a rule can be devised by state judges, Kagan noted, then it made
absolutely no sense for the Supreme Court to proclaim defeat by claiming
that it was impossible to devise a Kennedy-esque rule for federal judges. “[I]n
throwing up its hands,” Kagan wrote, “the majority misses something under
its nose: What it says can’t be done has been done.”120
IV. THE NEXT STEP?
On June 30, 2022, the Court granted certiorari in Moore v. Harper,121 in
which they were asked to affix a second set of locks on the doors to state
courthouses that matches the set of locks that they placed on the federal
courts in Rucho. As the subsequent article by Steven Shapiro will detail,122
117. Indeed, the Court has not had a majority of Justices appointed by a Democratic president
since 1971.
118. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307–08 (2004).
119. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2516 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. Given the emphatic nature of Roberts’ opinion, and the sentiment Kavanaugh expressed
during oral argument, it is tempting to speculate that behind the scenes, the Chief Justice lobbied
the newest member of the Court to see the case his way, and was able to overcome a possible instinct
Kavanaugh may have had to say yes to justiciability. Then again, given Roberts’ equally emphatic
belief that the Court should not take the drastic step of overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and his documented absolute failure to dissuade Kavanaugh (and four other Justices) from crossing
that Rubicon in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022), it does
seem as though the Chief Justice’s powers of persuasion are highly attenuated.
121. No. 21-1271 (U.S. cert. granted June 30, 2022).
122. Stephen M. Shapiro, Szeliga v. Lamone: An End to Gerrymandering in Maryland—Or Just
a Pause?, 82 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2022).
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the petitioners in Moore formally asked for a declaration that the Elections
Clause of Article I does not merely assign the task to drawing legislative
maps to state legislatures, but it also makes that assignment exclusive,
meaning that state courts have no legitimate authority to intervene. Arguing
that “[t]he Elections Clause [d]oes [n]ot [a]llow [s]tate [c]ourts [t]o [u]surp
the [a]uthority [i]t [a]ssigns to [s]tate [l]egislatures,”123 the petitioners are
asking for constitutional recognition of what is termed the “independent state
legislature” theory.124
On the surface, it might seem like a reasonable bet to ask a Supreme
Court which has already declared partisan gerrymandering to be a
nonjusticiable political question beyond the scope of federal judicial power
to make a similar declaration about state judicial power. Yet the trail of
crumbs the Court has left behind does suggest that they might not be willing
to extend their Rucho argument in this fashion.
One of the major factors Roberts invoked in his Rucho opinion to justify
barring federal courts from hearing cases about partisan gerrymandering is
that doing so did not in any way prevent the matter from being adjudicated
in state court. It is important to note that he embraced this dynamic, and did
not merely confirm that it was happening:
The States, for example, are actively addressing the issue on a
number of fronts. In 2015, the Supreme Court of Florida struck
down that State’s congressional districting plan as a violation of
the
Fair
Districts
Amendment
to
the
Florida
Constitution. . . . Provisions in state statutes and state constitutions
can provide standards and guidance for state courts to apply.125
In addition, Neil Gorsuch made a similar observation, with a similarly
approving tone, during Rucho’s oral argument: “you also have the state
supreme court option.”126
In light of these statements, it might be hard to envision the Court
declaring partisan gerrymanders off-limits to state judges. For Roberts and
Gorsuch to initially embrace the role state courts can play in such cases and
rely on it as a justification for a landmark ruling, only to disavow that position
a scant three years later, would be a course correction so dramatic—and so
transparently political—that it could do permanent damage to the
institutional reputation of the Court that Roberts has strained so hard to
protect.
123. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Moore, No. 21-1271 (emphasis added).
124. See Shapiro, supra note 122, at 60–61.
125. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (citing League of Women Voters
of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015)).
126. Rucho Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 91, at 70.
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And yet it might be the case that this resolute effort to keep the Court
free from accusations that it is a partisan body has already failed. The specter
of the perception of politicization was the very thing that motivated Roberts
to declare partisan gerrymandering a constitutional no-fly zone for the federal
courts in Rucho. But as one eminent analyst of the Court and elections law
suggested, the effort may have backfired. Declaring political gerrymanders
nonjusticiable may end up increasing, and not decreasing, the amount of
cases that the Court gets dragged into.
Noting that the Court has made two blanket statements—racial
gerrymanders are constitutionally barred, but partisan gerrymanders are
nonjusticiable—Richard Hasen concluded that the second statement will lead
to more challenges based on the first statement, and Hansen used David
Lewis’ brazen admission about his tactics as the illustrative example. “By so
openly declaring he was engaged in partisan politics,” Hasen reasoned, “Mr.
Lewis was trying to prove that race did not drive the North Carolina General
Assembly’s decisions.”127 Based on this, Hasen speculated:
[W]e
know
what
we
can
expect
in
North
Carolina . . . . Republicans will use sophisticated technology to
draw a very effective partisan gerrymander. They might even keep
redrawing lines every few years to keep their advantage. They will
proclaim loudly and often that their purpose is to help the
Republican Party. They will all be instructed not to talk about
race.128
Democrats and minority voting advocates will sue in federal court and
claim that this is a racial gerrymander in disguise. And federal courts will
have to figure out whether it was race or party that motivated the decision of
the state’s legislature.129
V. IS THE PROBLEM REALLY A PROBLEM?
It is assumed that partisan gerrymandering has a corrosive effect on
American politics by increasing polarization, entrenching minority power,
and reducing public trust in governance. However, it should be pointed out

127. Richard L. Hasen, The Gerrymandering Decision Drags the Supreme Court Further into
the
Mud,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/opinion/gerrymandering-rucho-supreme-court.html.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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that there are analysts who question this conventional wisdom,130 and even
analysts who argue that partisan gerrymandering is an affirmative good.
Nathaniel Persily observed that partisan gerrymandering is often
deployed to protect a party’s incumbents by rendering their seats safe, and
further reasoned that this provides important structural benefits to the
American political system, in two ways.131 First, it minimizes the misleading
and disproportionate effects of maximum political competition. If no seats
are safe, and if every seat is “in play,” then a political party which wins a
solid but not overwhelming victory by a couple of percentage points would
end up winning nearly every seat by that margin. As a result, an election that
was actually close in terms of vote share could result in a landslide in terms
of the number of seats won; a maximally competitive election would produce
a wildly unrepresentative legislature. Second, entrenching incumbents
preserves policymaking expertise, which is often accumulated over a period
of years. A maximally competitive election would inevitably result in the
ejection of some experienced legislators in favor of new ones who will not
have as developed an understanding of the issues; consequently, the
legislature would produce inferior-quality policies.
Relatedly, Thomas Brunell has speculated that entrenching incumbents
engenders more positive public attitudes about Congress, and about
governing in general.132 By cramming districts via gerrymandering with likeminded partisans, a key effect of partisan entrenchment is that a broad
majority of voters will always be happy with their representative, which
theoretically would translate into good opinions of Congress as a whole.
Refraining from drawing districts with this in mind, however, could produce
a widening gyre of voter anger. “[D]rawing districts with relatively equal
numbers of Democrats and Republicans maximizes the number of losing
voters (also known as wasted votes),” Brunell explained. “A voter on the
losing side of an election is systematically more likely to be unhappy with

130. For rebuttals to the assumption that gerrymandering increases polarization, see Nolan
McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 666, 666 (2009); John Sides, Gerrymandering Is Not What’s Wrong with American
Politics,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
3,
2013,
12:29
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/02/03/gerrymandering-is-not-whatswrong-with-american-politics/; Fred Dews, A Primer on Gerrymandering and Political
Polarization, BROOKINGS NOW (July 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookingsnow/2017/07/06/a-primer-on-gerrymandering-and-political-polarization/.
131. Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 667–71 (2002).
132. Thomas L. Brunell, Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts
Eliminates Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes Toward Congress, 39
POL. SCI. & POL. 77, 77 (2006).
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his representative and with Congress as an institution.”133 Moreover, by
entrenching incumbents, a legislature will be filled with veteran
representatives who will always be attuned to what their constituents want,
as opposed to less-experienced representatives who might face a steep
learning curve on that front.
None of this means, however, that Rucho can be described as an effort
to perfect democracy. Indeed, depending on the decision in Moore v. Harper,
if Rucho-plus-Moore turns out to stand for the proposition that federal courts
may not intervene in political gerrymandering, but state courts can, this
would have the effect of leaving the issue in the hand of mostly-elected state
judicial systems which are less reliably free of political bias than their federal
counterparts. Oddly, the effect of leaving state courts free to review political
gerrymanders conceivably could be a net increase in partisanship and
hyperpolarization, if politically-interested courts take such cases but then
uphold politically-motivated maps.
CONCLUSION
In one of the most-cited works of legal scholarship, John Hart Ely in
1980 tied judicial review to the preservation of democracy.134 Seeking an
alternative to the wide-ranging and frequently untethered rationale for
judicial review as a means of protecting individual rights, Ely argued that the
potent weapon of judicial review was an ideal device to ensure that everyone
has an equal right to participate in the political process. Observing that
partisan interests will always seek to entrench themselves, even by
undemocratic means, Ely emphasized the absolute need to prevent the
political process from being captured in this fashion. The constant danger in
a democracy, Ely maintained, is that whoever holds power will want to keep
it: “Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust,
when . . . the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out . . . .”135
Ely’s formulation not only depended upon the existence of an
independent judiciary safeguarding democracy, but it also served to reinforce
that judiciary’s credibility. In Ely’s mind, when independent courts, using the
power of judicial review, intervene in disputes about the political process,
their nonpartisan nature will give their decision a sheen of trustworthiness:
People will sense that the judges are doing the right thing for the right reason,
rather than operationalizing their partisan loyalties, or deciding a case a
133. Id. at 83.
134. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
135. Id. at 103 (emphasis in original).
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certain way because they have a stake in the outcome.136 Meanwhile, an
opinion by an independent and reliable court will stand in stark contrast to
the self-dealing and opportunistic behavior of political actors; that contrast
will in turn further emphasize the virtues of independent courts, and further
highlight the elevated quality of the work they produce.
Partisan gerrymanders are the classic example of “choking off the
channels of political change,” and thus both an opportunity to put Ely’s
theory into action, and an opportunity for the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts to enhance their institutional standing. However, the Roberts
Court saw the situation in the exact opposite fashion and endeavored to
firewall the issue of partisan gerrymandering from the federal judicial
system. If the point of that decision was to protect the Supreme Court’s
reputation from a belief that they have been politicized, then ignoring Ely’s
counsel has proven to be a spectacularly misguided strategy. In the aftermath
of Rucho, the Court’s standing in opinion polls has nosedived to
unprecedented historic lows.137 While there are likely a number of reasons
for that, especially in the immediate aftermath of Dobbs v. Jackson Womens’
Health Organization,138 it seems clear that one reason is that the public was
paying attention to the Court’s decision in Rucho to immunize the electionrigging that the public despises, and is holding the Court accountable for that
decision. In Moore v. Harper, the Court theoretically has a chance to undo
the damage. Whether they will utilize that chance, however, is an open
question.

136. This explains the argument by some scholars that even though the public was aware that in
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), a majority-conservative and majority-Republican Supreme Court
had effectively decided a disputed presidential election in favor of the Republican candidate, polling
done in the aftermath of the case revealed that the public accepted the decision (and did not see it
as illegitimately partisan), and also that the Court’s institutional reputation was not diminished. See
James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US
Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise? 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 535
(2003).
137. Jeffrey M. Jones, Supreme Court Trust, Job Approval at Historical Lows, GALLUP (Sept.
29,
2022)
https://news.gallup.com/poll/402044/supreme-court-trust-job-approval-historicallows.aspx.
138. 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).

